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Abstract
In this paper we investigate updates of knowledge bases represented by logic programs. In
order to represent negative information, we use generalized logic programs which allow de-
fault negation not only in rule bodies but also in their heads. We start by introducing the no-
tion of an update P  U of one logic program P by another logic program U. Subsequently,
we provide a precise semantic characterization of P  U , and study some basic properties of
program updates. In particular, we show that our update programs generalize the notion of
interpretation update. We then extend this notion to compositional sequences of logic pro-
grams updates P1  P2     ; defining a dynamic program update, and thereby introducing
the paradigm of dynamic logic programming. This paradigm significantly facilitates modular-
ization of logic programming, and thus modularization of non-monotonic reasoning as a
whole. Specifically, suppose that we are given a set of logic program modules, each describing
a dierent state of our knowledge of the world. Dierent states may represent dierent time
points or dierent sets of priorities or perhaps even dierent viewpoints. Consequently, pro-
gram modules may contain mutually contradictory as well as overlapping information. The
role of the dynamic program update is to employ the mutual relationships existing between
dierent modules to precisely determine, at any given module composition stage, the declara-
tive as well as the procedural semantics of the combined program resulting from the
modules. Ó 2000 Elsevier Science Inc. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Most of the work conducted so far in the field of logic programming has focused
on representing static knowledge, i.e., knowledge that does not evolve with time.
This is a serious drawback when dealing with dynamic knowledge bases in which
not only the extensional part (the set of facts) changes dynamically but so does
the intensional part (the set of rules).
In this paper we investigate updates of knowledge bases represented by logic pro-
grams. In order to represent negative information, we use generalized logic programs
which allow default negation not only in rule bodies but also in their heads. This is
needed, in particular, in order to specify that some atoms should became false, i.e.,
should be deleted. However, our updates are far more expressive than a mere inser-
tion and deletion of facts. They can be specified by means of arbitrary program rules
and thus they themselves are logic programs. Consequently, our approach demon-
strates how to update one generalized logic program P (the initial program) by an-
other generalized logic program U (the updating program), obtaining as a result a
new, updated logic program P  U .
Several authors have addressed the issue of updates of logic programs and deduc-
tive databases (see e.g. Refs. [1,12–14]), most of them following the so-called ‘‘inter-
pretation update’’ approach, originally proposed in Refs. [8,15]. This approach is
based on the idea of reducing the problem of finding an update of a knowledge base
DB by another knowledge base U to the problem of finding updates of its individual
interpretations (models 1). More precisely, a knowledge base DB0 is considered to be
the update of a knowledge base DB by U if the set of models of DB0 coincides with
the set of updated models of DB, i.e., ‘‘the set of models of DB0’’  ‘‘the set of up-
dated models of DB’’. Thus, according to the interpretation update approach, the
problem of finding an update of a deductive database DB is reduced to the problem
of finding individual updates of all of its relational instantiations (models) M. Unfor-
tunately, such an approach suers, in general, from several important drawbacks: 2
• In order to obtain the update DB0 of a knowledge base DB one has to first com-
pute all the models M of DB (typically, a daunting task) and then individually
compute their (possibly multiple) updates MU by U : An update MU of a given in-
terpretation M is obtained by changing the status of only those literals in M that
are ‘‘forced ’’ to change by the update U, while keeping all the other literals intact
by inertia (see e.g. Refs. [12–14]).
• The updated knowledge base DB0 is not defined directly but, instead, it is indirectly
characterized as a knowledge base whose models coincide with the set of all up-
dated models MU of DB. In general, there is therefore no natural way of comput-
ing 3 DB0 because the only straightforward candidate for DB0 is the typically
1 The notion of a model depends on the type of considered knowledge bases and on their semantics. In
this paper we are considering (generalized) logic programs under the stable model semantics.
2 In Ref. [1] the authors addressed the first two of the drawbacks mentioned below. They showed how to
directly construct, given a logic program P, another logic program P 0 whose partial stable models are
exactly the interpretation updates of the partial stable models of P. This eliminates both of these
drawbacks (in the case when knowledge bases are logic programs) but it does not eliminate the third, most
important drawback.
3 In fact, in general such a database DB0 may not exist at all.
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intractably large knowledge base DB00 consisting of all clauses that are entailed by
all the updated models MU of DB.
• Most importantly, while the semantics of the resulting knowledge base DB0 indeed
represents the intended meaning when just the extensional part of the knowledge
base DB (the set of facts) is being updated, it leads to strongly counter-intuitive re-
sults when also the intensional part of the database (the set of rules) undergoes
change, as the following example shows.
Example 1.1. Consider the logic program P :
P : sleep  not tv on
tv on  
watch tv  tv on:
1
Clearly M  ftv on; watch tvg is its only stable model. Suppose now that the update
U states that there is a power failure, and if there is a power failure then the TV is no
longer on, as represented by the logic program U:
U : not tv on  power failure
power failure  2
According to the above mentioned interpretation approach to updating, we would
obtain MU  fpower failure; watch tvg as the only update of M by U. This is because
power failure needs to be added to the model and its addition forces us to make tv on
false. As a result, even though there is a power failure, we are still watching TV.
However, by inspecting the initial program and the updating rules, we are likely
to conclude that since ‘‘watch tv’’ was true only because ‘‘tv on’’ was true, the remov-
al of ‘‘tv on’’ should make ‘‘watch tv’’ false by default. Moreover, one would expect
‘‘sleep’’ to become true as well. Consequently, the intended model of the update of P
by U is the model M
0
U  fpower failure; sleepg.
Suppose now that another update U2 follows, described by the logic program:
U2 : not power failure 3
stating that power is back up again. We should now expect the TV to be on again. Since
power was restored, i.e. ‘‘power failure’’ is false, the rule ‘‘not tv on power failure’’
of U should have no eect and the truth value of ‘‘tv on’’ should be obtained by
inertia from the rule ‘‘tv on ’’ of the original program P.
This example illustrates that, when updating knowledge bases, it is not sucient
to just consider the truth values of literals figuring in the heads of its rules because
the truth value of their rule bodies may also be aected by the updates of other lit-
erals. In other words, it suggests that the principle of inertia should be applied not
just to the individual literals in an interpretation but rather to the entire rules of
the knowledge base.
The above example also leads us to another important observation, namely, that
the notion of an update DB0 of one knowledge base DB by another knowledge base
U should not just depend on the semantics of the knowledge bases DB and U, as it is
the case with interpretation updates, but that it should also depend on their syntax.
This is best illustrated by the following, even simpler, example:
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Example 1.2. Consider the logic program P :
P : innocent  not found guilty 4
whose only stable model is M  finnocentg, because found guilty is false by default.
Suppose now that the update U states that the person has been found guilty:
U : found guilty  : 5
Using the interpretation approach, we would obtain MU  innocent; found guiltyf g
as the only update of M by U thus leading us to the counter-intuitive conclusion that
the person is both innocent and guilty. This is because found guilty must be added to
the model M and yet its addition does not force us to make innocent false. However,
it is intuitively clear that the interpretation M
0
U  found guiltyf g; stating that the
person is guilty but no longer presumed innocent, should be the only model of the
updated program. Observe, however, that the program P is semantically equivalent
to the following program P 0 :
P 0 : innocent  6
because the programs P and P 0 have exactly the same set of stable models, namely
the model M : Nevertheless, while the model MU  innocent; found guiltyf g is not
the intended model of the update of P by U it is in fact the only reasonable model
of the update of P 0 by U.
In this paper, we investigate the problem of updating knowledge bases represented
by generalized logic programs and we propose a new solution to this problem that
attempts to eliminate the drawbacks of the previously proposed approaches. Specif-
ically, given one generalized logic program P (the so called initial program) and an-
other logic program U (the updating program) we define a new generalized logic
program P  U called the update of P by U. The definition of the updated program
P  U does not require any computation of the models of either P or U and is in fact
obtained by means of a simple, linear-time transformation of the programs P and U :
As a result, the update transformation can be accomplished very eciently and its
implementation is quite straightforward. 4
Due to the fact that we apply the inertia principle not just to atoms but to entire
program rules, the semantics of our updated program P  U avoids the drawbacks
of interpretation updates and it seems to properly represent the intended semantics.
As mentioned above, the updated program P  U does not just depend on the se-
mantics of the programs P and U ; as it was the case with interpretation updates,
but it also depends on their syntax. In order to make the meaning of the updated
program clear and easily verifiable, we provide a complete characterization of the
semantics of updated programs P  U .
Nevertheless, while our notion of program update significantly diers from the
notion of interpretation update, it coincides with the latter (as originally introduced
in Ref. [12] under the name of revision program and later reformulated in the lan-
guage of logic programs in Refs. [13,14]) when the initial program P is purely exten-
sional, i.e., when the initial program is just a set of facts. Our definition also allows
4 The implementation is available at: http : ==centria:di:fct:unl:pt=jja=updates=.
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significant flexibility and can be easily modified to handle updates which incorporate
contradiction removal or specify dierent inertia rules. Consequently, our approach
can be viewed as introducing a general dynamic logic programming framework for
updating logic programs which can be suitably modified to make it fit dierent appli-
cation domains and requirements.
Finally, we extend the notion of program updates to sequences of programs, defin-
ing the so called dynamic program updates. The idea of dynamic updates is very simple
and quite fundamental. Suppose that we are given a set of program modules Ps, in-
dexed by dierent states of the world s. Each program Ps contains some knowledge
that is supposed to be true at the state s. Dierent states may represent dierent time
periods or dierent sets of priorities or perhaps even dierent viewpoints. Conse-
quently, the individual program modules may contain mutually contradictory as well
as overlapping information. The role of the dynamic program update fPs : s 2 Sg is
to use the mutual relationships existing between dierent states (as specified by the
order relation) to precisely determine, at any given state s, the declarative as well as
the procedural semantics of the combined program, composed of all modules.
Consequently, the notion of a dynamic program update supports the important
paradigm of dynamic logic programming. Given individual and largely independent
program modules Ps describing our knowledge at dierent states of the world (for
example, the knowledge acquired at dierent times), the dynamic program update
a fPs : s 2 Sg specifies the exact meaning of the union of these programs. Dynamic
programming significantly facilitates modularization of logic programming and, thus,
modularization of non-monotonic reasoning as a whole. Whereas traditional logic
programming has concerned itself mostly with representing static knowledge, we
show how to use logic programs to represent dynamically changing knowledge.
Our results extend and improve upon the approach initially proposed in Ref. [10],
where the authors first argued that the principle of inertia should be applied to the
rules of the initial program rather than to the individual literals in an interpretation.
However, the specific update transformation presented in Ref. [10] suered from
some drawbacks and was not suciently general.
We begin in Section 2 by defining the language of generalized logic programs,
which allow default negation in rule heads. We describe stable model semantics of
such programs as a special case of the approach proposed earlier in Ref. [11]. In Sec-
tion 3 we define the program update P  U of the initial program P by the updating
program U. In Section 4 we provide a complete characterization of the semantics of
program updates P  U and in Section 5 we study their basic properties. In Section 6
we introduce the notion of dynamic program updates. We close the paper with con-
cluding remarks and notes on future research.
2. Generalized logic programs and their stable models
In order to represent negative information in logic programs and in their updates,
we need more general logic programs that allow default negation not A not only in
premises of their clauses but also in their heads. 5 We call such programs generalized
5 For further motivation and intuitive reading of logic programs with default negations in the heads see
Ref. [11].
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logic programs. In this section we introduce generalized logic programs and extend
the stable model semantics of normal logic programs [6] to this broader class of pro-
grams. In the subsequent paper [5] we extend our results to 3-valued (partial) models
of logic programs, and thus, in particular, to well-founded semantics.
The class of generalized logic programs can be viewed as a special case of a yet
broader class of programs introduced earlier in Ref. [11]. While our definition is dif-
ferent and seems to be simpler than the one used in Ref. [11], when restricted to the
language that we are considering, the two definitions can be shown to be equivalent.
It should be stressed that the class of generalized logic programs diers from the class
of programs with the so called ‘‘classical’’ negation [7] which allow the use of strong
rather than default negation in their heads.
It will be convenient to syntactically represent generalized logic programs as prop-
ositional Horn theories. In particular, we will represent default negation not A as a
standard propositional variable (atom). Suppose that K is an arbitrary set of prop-
ositional variables whose names do not begin with a ‘‘not’’. By the propositional lan-
guage LK generated by the set K we mean the language L whose set of
propositional variables consists of
fA : A 2Kg [ fnot A : A 2Kg: 7
Atoms A 2K, are called objective atoms while the atoms not A are called default
atoms. From the definition it follows that the two sets are disjoint.
By a generalized logic program P in the language LK we mean a finite or infinite
set of propositional Horn clauses of the form:
L L1; . . . ; Ln; 8
where L and Li are atoms from LK. If all the atoms L appearing in heads of clauses
of P are objective atoms, then we say that the logic program P is normal. Conse-
quently, from a syntactic standpoint, a logic program is simply viewed as a propo-
sitional Horn theory. However, its semantics significantly diers from the
semantics of classical propositional theories and is determined by the class of stable
models defined below.
By a (2-valued) interpretation M of LK we mean any set of atoms from LK that
satisfies the condition that for any A in K, precisely one of the atoms A or not A be-
longs to M. Given an interpretation M we define:
M  fA 2K : A 2 Mg;
Mÿ  fnot A : A 2K; not A 2 Mg  fnot A : A 2K; A 62 Mg:
By a (2-valued) model M of a generalized logic program P we mean a (2-valued)
interpretation of P that satisfies all of its clauses. A program is called consistent if
it has a model. A model M is considered smaller than a model N if the set of objective
atoms of M is properly contained in the set of objective atoms of N. A model of P is
called minimal if there is no smaller model of P. A model of P is called least if it is the
smallest model of P. It is well known that every consistent program P has the least
model M  fA : A is an atom and P ` Ag.
Definition 2.1 (Stable models of generalized logic programs). We say that a (2-
valued) interpretation M of LK is a stable model of a generalized logic program
P if M is the least model of the Horn theory P [Mÿ:
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M  LeastP [Mÿ; 9
or, equivalently, if M  fA : A is an atom and P [Mÿ ` Ag.
Example 2.1. Consider the program:
a  not b c  b e not d
not d  not c; a d  not e 10
and let K  fa; b; c; d; eg. This program has precisely one stable model
M  fa; e; not b; not c; not dg. To see that M is stable we simply observe that:
M  LeastP [ fnot b; not c; not dg: 11
On the other hand, the interpretation N  fnot a; not e; b; c; dg is not a stable model
because:
N 6 LeastP [ fnot e; not ag  fd; not a; not eg: 12
Following an established tradition, whenever convenient we will be omitting the
default (negative) atoms when describing interpretations and models. Thus the above
model M will be simply listed as M  fa; eg.
Throughout the paper by the semantics of a generalized logic program we
mean the stable semantics. We also say that two generalized logic programs in
a given language L are semantically equivalent if they have the same set of stable
models.
Given a generalized logic program P and an interpretation M ; by the Gelfond–
Lifschitz transform of P w.r.t. M we mean a generalized logic program P=M ob-
tained from P by (a) removing from P all clauses which contain default premises
not A such that A 2 M ; and, (b) removing default premises not A from all the
remaining clauses. Clearly, the above definition extends the notion of the Gel-
fond–Lifschitz transform [6] from the class of normal programs to the class of
generalized logic programs. The following proposition easily follows from the defi-
nition of stable models.
Proposition 2.1. An interpretation M of LK is a stable model of a generalized logic
program P if and only if
M  A : A 2K and P
M
` A
 
13
and
Mÿ  not A : A 2K and P
M
` not A
 
: 14
Clearly, the second condition in the above proposition is always vacuously satisfied
for normal programs. Since the first condition characterizes stable models of normal
programs [6], we immediately obtain:
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Proposition 2.2. The class of stable models of generalized logic programs extends the
class of stable models of normal programs. More precisely, an interpretation is a stable
model of a normal program in the sense of Definition 2.1 if and only if it is a stable
model in the sense of Gelfond–Lifschitz [6].
3. Program updates
Suppose that K is an arbitrary set of propositional variables, and P and U are
two generalized logic programs in the language L LK. By K^ we denote the fol-
lowing superset of K:
K^ K [ fAÿ;AP ;AÿP ;AU ;AÿU : A 2Kg: 15
This definition assumes that the original set K of propositional variables does not
contain any of the newly added symbols of the form Aÿ; AP ; AÿP ; AU ; A
ÿ
U so that
they are all disjoint sets of symbols. If K contains any such symbols then they have
to be renamed before the extension of K takes place. We denote by L^ LK^ the
extension of the language L LK generated by K^.
Definition 3.1 (Program updates). Let P and U be generalized programs in the lan-
guage L. We call P the original program and U the updating program. By the up-
date of P by U we mean the generalized logic program P  U , which consists of the
following clauses in the extended language L^:
(RP) Rewritten original program clauses:
AP  B1; . . . ;Bm;Cÿ1 ; . . . ;Cÿn 16
AÿP  B1; . . . ;Bm;Cÿ1 ; . . . ;Cÿn 17
for any clause:
A  B1; . . . ;Bm; not C1; . . . ; not Cn;
respectively,
not A  B1; . . . ;Bm; not C1; . . . ; not Cn;
in the original program P. The rewritten clauses are obtained from the original ones
by replacing atoms A (respectively, the atoms not A) occurring in their heads by the
atoms AP (respectively, AÿP ) and by replacing negative premises not C by C
ÿ:
The role of the new meta-level atoms AP and AÿP is to indicate the fact that these
clauses originally came from the program P. Moreover, as we will demonstrate be-
low, the new atoms Aÿ serve as meta-language representation of the default atoms
not A:
(RU) Rewritten updating program clauses:
AU  B1; . . . ;Bm;Cÿ1 ; . . . ;Cÿn 18
AÿU  B1; . . . ;Bm;Cÿ1 ; . . . ;Cÿn 19
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for any clause:
A  B1; . . . ;Bm; not C1; . . . ; not Cn;
respectively,
not A B1; . . . ;Bm; not C1; . . . ; not Cn;
in the updating program U. The rewritten clauses are obtained from the original ones
by replacing atoms A (respectively, the atoms not A) occurring in their heads by the
atoms AU (respectively, AÿU ) and by replacing negative premises not C by C
ÿ:
The role of the new meta-level atoms AU and AÿU is to indicate the fact that these
clauses originally came from the updating program U : Moreover, as we will demon-
strate below, the new atoms Aÿ serve as meta-language representation of the default
atoms not A.
(UR) Update rules:
A AU 20
Aÿ  AÿU 21
for all objective atoms A 2K. The update rules state that an atom A must be true (re-
spectively, false) in P  U if it is true (respectively, false) in the updating program U.
(IR) Inheritance rules:
A AP ; not AÿU 22
Aÿ  AÿP ; not AU 23
for all objective atoms A 2K. The inheritance rules say that an atom A (respective-
ly, Aÿ) in the updated program P  U is inherited (by inertia) from the original pro-
gram P provided it is not rejected (i.e., forced to be false) by the updating program
U. More precisely, an atom A is true (respectively, false) in P  U if it is true (respec-
tively, false) in the original program P ; provided it is not made false (respectively,
true) by the updating program U.
(DR) Default rules:
Aÿ  not AP ; not AU 24
not A Aÿ; 25
for all objective atoms A 2K. The first default rule states that an atom A in P  U is
false if it is neither true in the original program P nor in the updating program U.
The second says that if an atom is false then it can be assumed to be false by default.
It also ensures that A and Aÿ cannot both be true.
Proposition 3.1. Any model N of P  U is coherent, by which we mean that A is true
(respectively, false) in N iff Aÿ is false (respectively, true) in N, for any A 2K. In other
words, every model of P  U satisfies the constraint not A  Aÿ.
Proof. Clearly, due to the second default rule, A and Aÿ cannot both be true in N . On
the other hand, if both A and Aÿ are false in N then, due to the update rules, both
not AU and not AÿU must be true. From the first inheritance axiom we infer that not AP
must hold, which, in view of the first default rule, leads to a contradiction. 
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Remark 3.1. According to the above proposition, the atoms Aÿ can be simply re-
garded as meta-level representation of the default negation atoms not A. Similarly,
the remaining, newly added atoms, AP , AÿP ; AU and A
ÿ
U serve as meta-level represen-
tation of the atoms (or their default negations) derivable from programs P and U ;
respectively.
When we discuss interpretations or models of the extended language L^ LK^ we
often restrict our attention to the ‘‘relevant’’ atoms, i.e., to the atoms from the base
language L LK and thus we ignore, whenever justified, the auxiliary, meta-level
atoms Aÿ; AP , AÿP ; AU and A
ÿ
U .
Example 3.1. Consider the programs P and U from Example 1.1:
P : sleep  not tv on
tv on  
watch tv  tv on
U : not tv on  power failure
power failure  
26
The update of the program P by the program U is the logic program
P  U  RP  [ RU [ UR [ IR [ DR, where
RP : sleepP  tv onÿ
tv onP  
watch tvP  tv on
RU : tv onÿU  power failure
power failureU  
27
It is easy to verify that M  fpower failure; sleepg is the only stable model (restricted
to relevant atoms) of P  U . Indeed, power failure follows from the second clause of
(RU) and from the Update Rules (UR). Now from power failure, the first rule of
(RU) and the Update Rules (UR) we deduce tv onÿ and thus also not tv on. From
the first rule of (RP) we infer sleepP and from the Inheritance Rules (IR) we deduce
sleep. Finally, watch tvÿ and not watch tv follow from the default rules.
4. Semantic characterization of program updates
In this section we provide a complete semantic characterization of update pro-
grams P  U by describing their stable models. This characterization shows precisely
how the semantics of the update program P  U depends on the syntax and seman-
tics of the programs P and U.
Let P and U be fixed generalized logic programs in the language L. Since the up-
date program P  U is defined in the extended language L^, we begin by first showing
how interpretations of the language L can be naturally extended to interpretations
of the extended language L^.
Since any model N of the update program P  U is coherent (see Proposition 3.1)
and since the atoms AP ;AÿP ;AU and A
ÿ
U appear only in the heads of the rewritten
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program rules, if N is a minimal (in particular, stable) model of the update program
P  U then N must satisfy, for any A 2K:
Aÿ 2 N iff not A 2 N
AP 2 N iff 9 A Body 2 P and N  Body
AÿP 2 M iff 9 not A Body 2 P and N  Body 28
AU 2 M iff 9 A Body 2 U and N  Body
AÿU 2 bN iff 9 not A Body 2 U and N  Body:
Accordingly, the truth or falsity in N of the atoms Aÿ; AP ; AÿP ; AU and A
ÿ
U depends
only on the truth or falsity in N of the atoms A from K. This leads us to the follow-
ing definition:
Definition 4.1 (Extended Interpretation). For any interpretation M of L we denote
by bM its extension to an interpretation of the extended language L^ defined, for any
atom A 2K, by the following rules:
Aÿ 2 bM iff not A 2 M
AP 2 bM iff 9 A Body 2 P and M  Body
AÿP 2 bM iff 9 not A Body 2 P and M  Body
AU 2 bM iff 9 A Body 2 U and M  Body
AÿU 2 bM iff 9 not A Body 2 U and M  Body:
This definition immediately implies:
Proposition 4.1. If N is a minimal model of the update program P  U and M  N jL is
its restriction to the language L then N  bM .
We will also need the following definition:
Definition 4.2. For any interpretation M of the language L define:
DefaultsM   fnot A : 8A Body 2 P [ U we have M2Bodyg;
RejectedM   fA Body 2 P : M  Body; 9not A Body 0 2 U ; M  Body 0g
[ fnot A Body 2 P : M  Body; 9 A Body 0 2 U ; M  Body 0g;
ResidueM   P [ U ÿ RejectedM :
The set DefaultsM  contains default negations not A of all unsupported atoms A in
M , i.e., atoms that have the property that the body of every clause from P [ U with
the head A is false in M. Consequently, negation not A of these unsupported atoms A
can be assumed by default. The set Rejected M   P represents the set of clauses of
the original program P that are rejected (or contradicted) by the update program U
and the interpretation M. The residue ResidueM  consists of all clauses in the union
P [ U of programs P and U that were not rejected by the update program U. Note
that all the three sets depend on the interpretation M as well as on the syntax of the
programs P and U :
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Now we are able to describe the semantics of the update program P  U by pro-
viding a complete characterization of its stable models.
Theorem 4.1 (Characterization of stable models of update programs). An interpr-
etation N of the language L^ LK^ is a stable model of the update program P  U
if and only if N is the extension N  bM of an interpretation M of the language L that
satisfies the condition:
M  LeastP [ U ÿ Rejected M  [ DefaultsM ; 29
or, equivalently:
M  LeastResidueM  [ DefaultsM :
Proof. ) Suppose that N is a stable model of the update program P  U and let
R  P  U [ Nÿ. From Definition 2.1 it follows that
N  LeastR  LeastP  U [ Nÿ: 30
Let T  ResidueM  [ DefaultsM  and let H  LeastT  be its least model (in the
language L. We are supposed to show that the restriction M  N jL of N to the
language L coincides with H. From Proposition 4.1, we infer that the following
equivalences hold true for every atom A 2K:
Aÿ 2 N iff not A 2 M iff not A 2 N
AP 2 N iff 9 A Body 2 P ; M  Body iff 9 A Body 2 P ; N  Body
AÿP 2 N iff 9 not A Body 2 P ; M  Body iff 9 not A Body 2 P ; N  Body
AU 2 N iff 9 A Body 2 U ; M  Body iff 9 A Body 2 U ; N  Body
AÿU 2 N iff 9 not A Body 2 U ; M  Body iff 9 not A Body 2 U ; N  Body:
31
Denote by S the sub-language of L^ that includes only propositional symbols
fA : A 2Kg [ fAÿ : A 2Kg: By means of several simple reductions we will trans-
form the program R  P  U [ Nÿ in the language L^ into a simpler program Y
in the language S so that:
• The least model J  LeastY  of Y is equal to the least model N  LeastR of R
when restricted to the language S, i.e., J  N jS.
• The program Y in the language S is syntactically identical to the program
T  ResidueM  [ DefaultsM  in the language L, except that not A is everywhere
replaced by Aÿ:
First of all, we observe that from (31) it follows that for any A 2K neither AP nor
AU belongs to N if and only if not A 2 DefaultsM : Accordingly, the first default rule
in R  P  U [ Nÿ, namely, Aÿ  not AP ; not AU , can be replaced by the rule:
Aÿ; for all A 2K such that not A 2 DefaultsM 
without aecting the least model of R. As a result we obtained a transformed
program R0.
From (31) it also follows that the inheritance rules (IR):
A AP ; not AÿU 32
Aÿ  AÿP ; not AU 33
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in R0 can be replaced by the simpler rules:
A AP 34
Aÿ  AÿP 35
without aecting the least model of R0 restricted to the language S as long as we re-
move from R0 all the rules:
AP  B1; . . . ;Bm;Cÿ1 ; . . . ;Cÿn 36
AÿP  B1; . . . ;Bm;Cÿ1 ; . . . ;Cÿn 37
respectively, that correspond to program rules:
A  B1; . . . ;Bm; not C1; . . . ; not Cn;
not A  B1; . . . ;Bm; not C1; . . . ; not Cn;
from P that were rejected by U ; i.e., to the rules that belong to Rejected M : This is
due to the fact that both AP and AÿU (respectively, both A
ÿ
P and AU are true in N if
and only if there is a program clause:
A B1; . . . ;Bm; not C1; . . . ; not Cn;
respectively:
not A  B1; . . . ;Bm; not C1; . . . ; not Cn;
in P that belongs to Rejected M : Since the propositional symbols AP and AÿP do not
appear in bodies of any other clauses from R0, removing these rules from R0 does
not in anyway aect the truth of the propositional symbols A and Aÿ and thus it does
not aect the least model of R0 restricted to the language S. As a result we obtain the
program R00:
We can now remove all the negative facts in Nÿ and the default rules not A Aÿ
from R00 because they only involve propositional symbols not A which no longer
appear in bodies of any other clauses from R00and thus do not aect the least model
of R00 restricted to the language S. As a result we obtain the program R000:
Finally, since we are only interested in the sub-language S, we can now safely
remove from R000 all the auxiliary propositional symbols AP and AÿP ; obtaining as a
result the final program Y in the language S that consists of all the clauses:
A B1; . . . ;Bm;Cÿ1 ; . . . ;Cÿn
Aÿ  B1; . . . ;Bm;Cÿ1 ; . . . ;Cÿn
corresponding to the clauses from ResidueM   P [ U ÿ RejectedM  together with
all the atomic facts:
Aÿ; where not A 2 DefaultsM :
Clearly, this program is entirely identical to the program T  ResidueM  [
DefaultsM ; except that not A is everywhere replaced by Aÿ: Consequently, the least
model J of Y is identical to the least model H of T, except that not A is everywhere
replaced by Aÿ. Moreover, due to the way in which it was obtained, the least model
J  LeastY  of the program Y is equal to the least model N  LeastR of R restrict-
ed to the language S, i.e., J  N jS. This implies that for any A 2K:
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A 2 N iff A 2 J iff A 2 H
Aÿ 2 N iff Aÿ 2 J iff not A 2 H :
We conclude that M  N jL  H , because from (31) it follows that not A 2 N i
Aÿ 2 N : This completes the proof of the implication from left to right.
The converse implication is established in a completely analogous way. 
Example 4.1. Consider again the programs P and U from Example 1.1. Let
M  fpower failure; sleepg. We obtain:
Rejected M   tv onf  g
ResidueM  
sleep  not tv on
watch tv tv on
not tv on power failure
power failure 
8>><>>:
9>>=>>;
DefaultsM   not twatch tvf g
and thus it is easy to see that
M  LeastResidueM  [ DefaultsM :
Consequently, bM is a stable model of the update program P  U . In fact, it is the
only stable model of this program.
5. Properties of program updates
In this section, we study the basic properties of program updates. Since
DefaultsM   Mÿ, we conclude that the condition
M  LeastResidueM  [ DefaultsM  C1
which, according to Theorem 4.1, is equivalent to bM being a stable model of P  U ,
clearly implies the condition:
M  LeastResidueM  [Mÿ C2
which, according to Proposition 2.1, is equivalent to M being a stable model of
ResidueM   P [ U ÿ Rejected M . Consequently, we immediately obtain:
Proposition 5.1. If N is a stable model of P  U then its restriction M  N jL to the
language L is a stable model of ResidueM   P [ U ÿ Rejected M .
In general, the converse of the above implication does not hold. This is because
(C1) states that the model M is determined not just by the set Mÿ of all negative
atoms not A but rather by the generally smaller set DefaultsM  of negations of
unsupported atoms.
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Example 5.1. Let P contain only the fact A , let U contain only the clause
not A not A and let M  fnot Ag. Since ResidueM   U clearly M is a stable model
of ResidueM  and thus satisfies the condition (C2). However, since DefaultsM   ;
the interpretation M does not satisfy (C1) and thus bM is not a stable model of the
updated program P  U . In fact, M  fAg is the only stable model of P  U .
However, if Rejected M   ; then the two conditions (C1) and (C2) coincide
because then M is a model of ResidueM  P [ U and thus DefaultsM   Mÿ. In
particular, RejectedM   ; if M is a stable model of P [ U which yields:
Proposition 5.2. If M is a stable model of the union P [ U of programs P and U then
its extension N  bM is a stable model of the update program P  U . Thus, the seman-
tics of the update program P  U is always weaker than or equal to the semantics of the
union P [ U of programs P and U.
In general, the converse of the above result does not hold. In particular, the union
P [ U may be a contradictory program with no stable models.
Example 5.2. Consider again the programs P and U from Example 1.1. It is easy to
see that P [ U is contradictory.
Similarly, if either P or U is empty then, for any interpretation M ;
Rejected M   ;, and, therefore we conclude:
Proposition 5.3. If either P or U is empty then M is a stable model of P [ U iff N  bM
is a stable model of P  U . Thus, in this case, the semantics of the update program
P  U coincides with the semantics of the union P [ U .
If both P and U are normal programs, or, alternatively, if both P and U have only
clauses with default atoms not A in their heads, then also RejectedM   ; and there-
fore we obtain:
Proposition 5.4. If both P and U are normal programs (or if both have only clauses
with default atoms not A in their heads) then M is a stable model of P [ U iff
N  bM is a stable model of P  U . Thus, in this case the semantics of the update pro-
gram P  U also coincides with the semantics of the union P [ U of programs P and U.
5.1. Program updates generalize interpretation updates
In this section we show that interpretation updates, originally introduced under the
name ‘‘revision programs’’ by Marek and Truszczynski [12], and subsequently given a
somewhat simpler characterization by Przymusinski and Turner [13,14], constitute a
special case of program updates. Here, we identify the ‘‘revision rules’’:
inA  inB; outC
outA  inB; outC 38
J.J. Alferes et al. / J. Logic Programming 45 (2000) 43–70 57
used in Ref. [12], with the following generalized logic program clauses:
A B; not C
not A B; not C: 39
Theorem 5.1 (Program updates generalize interpretation updates). Let I be any
interpretation and U any updating program in the language L. Denote by PI the
generalized logic program in L defined by
PI  fA : A 2 Ig [ fnot A : not A 2 Ig:
Then bM is a stable model of the program update PI  U of the program PI by the pro-
gram U iff M is an interpretation update of I by U (in the sense of [12]).
Proof. Przymusinski and Turner [13,14] showed that an interpretation M of L is an
interpretation update (in the sense of [12]) of I by a program U i M is a stable model
of the following program P I ;U:
Encoded interpretation I:
AI  
for every A such that A is in I, and
AÿI  
for every A such that not A is in I.
Rewritten clauses from U:
A B1; . . . ;Bm;Cÿ1 ; . . . ;Cÿn 40
Aÿ  B1; . . . ;Bm;Cÿ1 ; . . . ;Cÿn 41
for any clause:
A  B1; . . . ;Bm; not C1; . . . ; not Cn;
respectively,
not A  B1; . . . ;Bm; not C1; . . . ; not Cn;
in the updating program U.
Inheritance rules:
A AI ; not Aÿ 42
Aÿ  AÿI ; not A 43
for all objective atoms A 2K.
Default rule:
not A Aÿ;
for all objective atoms A 2K.
It is easy to see that the above program PI ;U is semantically equivalent to the
program update PI  U of the program PI by the updating program U .
This theorem shows that when the initial program P is purely extensional, i.e.,
contains only positive or negative facts, then the interpretation update of P by U
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is semantically equivalent to the updated program P  U . As shown by the Examples
1.1 and 1.2, when P contains deductive rules then the two notions become signifi-
cantly dierent.
Remark 5.1. It is easy to see that, equivalently, we could include only positive facts
in the definition of the program PI :
PI  fA : A 2 Ig
thus resulting in a normal program PI .
5.2. Adding strong negation
We now show that it is easy to add strong negation ÿA [2,3,7] to generalized logic
programs. This demonstrates that the class of generalized logic programs is at least
as expressive as the class of logic programs with strong negation. It also allows us to
update logic programs with strong negation and to use strong negation in updating
programs.
Definition 5.1 (Adding strong negation). Let K be an arbitrary set of propositional
variables. In order to add strong negation to the language L LK we just augment
the set K with new propositional symbols fÿA : A 2Kg, obtaining the new set K,
and consider the extended language L LK . In order to ensure that A and ÿA
cannot be both true we also assume, for all A 2K, the following strong negation
axioms, which themselves are generalized logic program clauses:
not A ÿA
not ÿA A: SN
Remark 5.2. In order to prevent the strong negation rules (SN) from being inadver-
tently overruled by the updating program U, one may want to make them always
part of the most current updating program (see the next section).
6. Dynamic program updates
In this section we introduce the notion of dynamic program update a Ps : s 2 Sf g
over an ordered set P  Ps : s 2 Sf g of logic programs which provides an important
generalization of the notion of single program updates P  U introduced in Section 3.
The idea of dynamic updates, inspired by Leite [9], is simple and quite fundamen-
tal. Suppose that we are given a set of program modules Ps, indexed by dierent
states of the world s. Each program Ps contains some knowledge that is supposed
to be true at the state s. Dierent states may represent dierent time periods or dif-
ferent sets of priorities or perhaps even dierent viewpoints. Consequently, the indi-
vidual program modules may contain mutually contradictory as well as overlapping
information. The role of the dynamic program update afPs : s 2 Sg is to use the
mutual relationships existing between dierent states (and specified in the form of
the ordering relation) to precisely determine, at any given state s, the declarative
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as well as the procedural semantics of the combined program, composed of all mod-
ules.
Consequently, the notion of a dynamic program update supports the important
paradigm of dynamic logic programming. Given individual and largely independent
program modules Ps describing our knowledge at dierent states of the world (for
example, the knowledge acquired at dierent times), the dynamic program update
afPs : s 2 Sg specifies the exact meaning of the union of these programs. Dynamic
programming significantly facilitates modularization of logic programming and,
thus, modularization of non-monotonic reasoning as a whole.
Suppose that P  fPs : s 2 Sg is a finite or infinite sequence of generalized logic
programs in the language L LK, indexed by the finite or infinite set
S  f1; 2; . . . ; n; . . .g of natural numbers. We will call elements s of the set S [ f0g
states and we will refer to 0 as the initial state.
Remark 6.1. Instead of a linear sequence of states S [ f0g one could as well consider
any finite or infinite ordered set with the smallest element s0 and with the property
that every state s other than s0 has an immediate predecessor sÿ 1 and that for every
state s; the initial state s0 is the nth immediate predecessor of s, for some finite n. In
particular, one may use a finite or infinite tree with the root s0 and the property that
every node (state) has only a finite number of ancestors.
By K we denote the following superset of the set K of propositional variables:
K K [ fAÿ;As;Aÿs ;APs ;AÿPs : A 2K; s 2 S [ f0gg:
As before, this definition assumes that the original set K of propositional variables
does not contain any of the newly added symbols of the form Aÿ;As;Aÿs ;APs ;A
ÿ
Ps
so
that they are all disjoint sets of symbols. If the original language K contains any
such symbols then they have to be renamed before the extension of K takes place.
We denote by L LK the extension of the language L LK generated by K.
Definition 6.1 (Dynamic program update). By the dynamic program update over the
sequence of updating programs P  fPs : s 2 Sg we mean the logic program
U
P,
which consists of the following clauses in the extended language L:
(RP) Rewritten program clauses:
APs  B1; . . . ;Bm;Cÿ1 ; . . . ;Cÿn 44
AÿPs  B1; . . . ;Bm;Cÿ1 ; . . . ;Cÿn 45
for any clause:
A  B1; . . . ;Bm; not C1; . . . ; not Cn
respectively, for any clause:
not A  B1; . . . ;Bm; not C1; . . . ; not Cn
in the program Ps, where s 2 S. The rewritten clauses are simply obtained from the
original ones by replacing atoms A (respectively, the atoms not A) occurring in their
heads by the atoms APs (respectively, A
ÿ
Ps
) and by replacing negative premises not C
by Cÿ.
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(UR) Update rules:
As  APs
Aÿs  AÿPs
46
for all objective atoms A 2K and for all s 2 S. The update rules state that an atom
A must be true (respectively, false) in the state s 2 S if it is true (respectively, false) in
the updating program Ps.
(IR) Inheritance rules:
As  Asÿ1; not AÿPs 47
Aÿs  Aÿsÿ1; not APs 48
for all objective atoms A 2K and for all s 2 S. The inheritance rules say that an
atom A is true (respectively, false) in the state s 2 S if it is true (respectively, false)
in the previous state sÿ 1 and it is not rejected, i.e., forced to be false (respectively,
true), by the updating program Ps.
(DR) Default rules:
Aÿ0 ; 49
for all objective atoms A 2K. Default rules describe the initial state 0 by making all
objective atoms initially false.
Observe that the dynamic program update
U
P is a normal logic program, i.e., it
does not contain default negation in heads of its clauses. Moreover, only the inher-
itance rules contain default negation in their bodies. Also note that the program
U
P
does not contain the atoms A or Aÿ, where A 2K, in heads of its clauses. These
atoms appear only in the bodies of rewritten program clauses. The notion of the
dynamic program update asP at a given state s 2 S changes that.
Definition 6.2 (Dynamic program update at a given state). Given a fixed state s 2 S;
by the dynamic program update at the state s, denoted by asP, we mean the
dynamic program update
U
P augmented with the following:
CSs Current state rules:
A As 50
Aÿ  Aÿs 51
not A Aÿs 52
for all objective atoms A 2K. Current state rules specify the current state s in which
the updated program is being evaluated and determine the values of the atoms A; Aÿ
and not A.
In particular, if the set S has the largest element max then we simply write P
instead of amaxP.
Observe that although for any particular state s the program
U
P is not required
to be coherent, the program update asP at the state s must be coherent (see
Proposition 3.1).
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The notion of a dynamic program update generalizes the previously introduced
notion of an update P  U of two programs P and U.
Theorem 6.1. Let P1 and P2 be arbitrary generalized logic programs and let S  f1; 2g.
The dynamic program update afP1; P2g a2fP1; P2g, at the state s  2, is semanti-
cally equivalent to the program update P1  P2 defined in Section 3.
Proof. The dynamic program update afP1; P2g contains the following rules.
Rewritten program rules:
APs  B1; . . . ;Bm;Cÿ1 ; . . . ;Cÿn
AÿPs  B1; . . . ;Bm;Cÿ1 ; . . . ;Cÿn
Update and inheritance rules:
A1  AP1 A2  AP2
Aÿ1  AÿP1 Aÿ2  AÿP2
A1  A0; not AÿP1 A2  A1; not AÿP2
Aÿ1  Aÿ0 ; not AP1 Aÿ2  Aÿ1 ; not AP2
Default rules:
Aÿ0 ;
Current state rules:
A A2
Aÿ  Aÿ2
not A Aÿ2
The rewritten program rules are the same as the corresponding rules in P1  P2. By
eliminating A0’s and A2’s, the remaining rules reduce to:
A1  AP1 A  AP2
Aÿ1  AÿP1 Aÿ  AÿP2
not A  Aÿ A  A1; not AÿP2
Aÿ1  not AP1 Aÿ  Aÿ1 ; not AP2
By further eliminating A1’s, the above rules reduce to:
A  AP2
Aÿ  AÿP2
not A  Aÿ A  AP1 ; not AÿP2
Aÿ  not AP1 ; not AP2 Aÿ  AÿP1 ; not AP2
and thus coincide with the remaining rules in P1  P2; which completes the proof. 
6.1. Examples
Example 6.1. Let P  P1; P2; P3f g, where P1, P2 and P3 are as follows:
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P1 : sleep  not tv on
watch tv tv on
tv on 
P2 : not tv on power failure
power failure 
P3 : not power failure 
The dynamic program update over P is the logic program
U
P  RP1
[RP2 [ RP3 [ UR [ IR [ DR, where
RP1 : sleepP1  tv onÿ
watch tvP1  tv on
tv onP1  
RP2 : tv onÿP2  power failure 53
power failureP2  
RP3 : power failureÿP3  
and the dynamic program update at the state s is asP 
U
P [ CSs. Consequent-
ly, as intended, 1P has a single stable model M1  tv on;watch tvf g; a2P has a
single stable model M2  sleep; power failuref g and aP a3P has a single stable
model M3  tv on;watch tvf g (all models modulo irrelevant literals). Moreover,
a
2
P is semantically equivalent to P1  P2.
As mentioned in Section 1, in dynamic logic programming, logic program
modules describe states of our knowledge of the world, where dierent states
may represent dierent time points or dierent sets of priorities or even dierent
viewpoints. It is not our purpose in this paper to discuss in detail how to apply
dynamic logic programming to any of these application domains. 6 However,
since all of the examples presented so far relate dierent program modules with
changing time, below we illustrate how to use dynamic logic programming to rep-
resent the well-known problem in the domain of taxonomies by using priorities
among rules.
Example 6.2. Consider the well-known problem of flying birds. In this example
we have several rules with dierent priorities. First, the animals-do-not-fly rule,
which has the lowest priority; then the birds-fly rule with a higher priority; the
penguins-do-not-fly rule with an even higher priority; and, finally, with the high-
est priority, all the rules describing the actual taxonomy (penguins are birds,
birds are animals, etc.). This can be coded quite naturally in dynamic logic
programming:
6 In fact, this is the subject of our ongoing research. In particular, the application of dynamic logic
programming to the domain of actions is the subject of our ongoing research (see also Refs. [4,5]).
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P1 : not flyX   animalX 
P2 : flyX   birdX 
P3 : not flyX   penguinX 
P4 : animalX   birdX 
birdX   penguinX 
animalpluto
birdduffy
penguintweety
The reader can easily check that, as intended, the dynamic logic program at state 4,
4fP1; P2; P3; P4g, has a single stable model where flydu f fy is true, and both
flypluto and flytweety are false. The reader can also use the implementation of
dynamic updates (available at http : ==centria:di:fct:unl:pt=jja=updates=) to
verify this claim.
Sometimes it is useful to have some kind of a background knowledge, i.e., know-
ledge that is true in every program module or state. This is true, for example, in the
case of the strong negation axioms (SN) discussed in Section 5.2, because these axi-
oms must be true in every program module. This is true as well in the case of the
taxonomy rules discussed in the previous example as well as in the general case of
laws in the domain of actions and eects of action. These laws must be valid in every
state and at any time (for example, the law saying that if there is no power then the
TV must be o).
Rules describing background knowledge, i.e., background rules, are easily repre-
sentable in dynamic logic programming: if a rule is valid in every program state, sim-
ply add that rule to every program state. However, this is not a very practical, and,
especially, not a very ecient way of representing background rules. Fortunately, in
dynamic program updates at a given state s, adding a rule to every state is equivalent
to adding that rule only in the state s:
Proposition 6.1. Let asP be a dynamic program update at state s, and let r be a rule
such that 8Pi 2 P; r 2 Pi. LetP0 be the set of logic programs obtained from P such that
Ps 2 P0 and
8i 6 s; P 0i  Pi ÿ frg 2 P0 iff Pi 2 P
Let SM asPjK (respectively SM asP0jK) denote the set of all stable models of
asP (respectively asP
0) restricted to the language K. Then:
SM asP
ÿ jK  SM asP0 jK
Proof. We begin by proving the following lemma, which shows that if a rule belongs
to two consecutive states, then it may be removed from the one with a smaller index,
without aecting the stable models (restricted to K):
Lemma 6.1. Let P1  fP 1i : i 2 Sg be such that there exists a rule r:
L B1; . . . ;Bm; not C1; . . . ; not Cn
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where L is a literal, and r 2 P 1j and r 2 P 1j1, for some j < s. Let P2  fP 2i : i 2 Sg be
such that
8i 6 j P 2i  P 1i and P 2j  P 1j ÿ frg
Then SM asP1
ÿ jK  SM asP2ÿ jK.
Proof. The proof is made by separately proving that:
1. for every stable model M1 of asP1, there exists a stable model M2 of asP2 such
that M2jK  M1jK;
2. for every stable model M2 of asP2, there exists a stable model M1 of asP1 such
that M1jK  M2jK.
Each one of these is proven by constructing, for the various possible M1 (respec-
tively M2, for the second item) the corresponding M1 (respectively M2).
First note that, by definition of dynamic program update at a given state,
asP1 asP2 [ frjg, where rj is: 7
LPj  B1; . . . ;Bm;Cÿ1 ; . . . ;Cÿn
1. Let M1 be a stable model of asP1.
If fB1; . . . ;Bm;Cÿ1 ; . . . ;Cÿn g 6 M1 then it is clear that removing from a program a
(definite) rule whose body is false, does not aect the stable model. In fact:
Least
asP1
M1
 
 Least asP1 ÿ frjg
M1
 
:
So, given that rj does not contain any default literals, M1 itself is also a stable model
of asP2.
If fB1; . . . ;Bm;Cÿ1 ; . . . ;Cÿn g  M1 then fLPj ; LPj1g  M1 and also, given the update
rules (UR), fLj; Lj1g  M1 . Moreover, assume that M1 itself is not a stable model of
asP2 (otherwise the lemma is obviously satisfied). In this case, a stable model of
asP2 cannot contain LPj (note that the only dierence between asP1 and asP2
is that the latter does not have a rule whose head is LPj ).
The only rules, in either asP1 or asP2, with LPj in the body are:
8
r1 Lÿj  Lÿjÿ1; not LPj and r2 Lj  LPj
and the only rules with either Lÿj or Lj in the body are:
r3 Lj1  Lj; not LÿPj1 and r4 Lÿj1  Lÿj ; not LPj1
Moreover, both sP1 and sP2 contain the rules:
r5 LPj1  B1; . . . ;Bm;Cÿ1 ; . . . ;Cÿn and r6 Lj1  LPj1
• If Lÿjÿ1 62 M1 then M2  M1 ÿ fLj; LPjg is a stable model of asP2. In fact, note
that the dierences between asP1=M1 and asP2=M2 are that Lÿj  Lÿjÿ1
belongs only to the latter, and rj only to the former. Then,
Lÿjÿ1 62 LeastasP2=M2, and since both r5 and r6 belong to asP2,
7 Where LPj is APj if L is an atom A, or A
ÿ
Pj if L is a default literal not A.
8 In the following rules Lÿ should be interpreted as the complement of L w.r.t. to ÿ. I.e. if L is of the
form Aÿ then Lÿ is of the form A.
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fLPj1 ; Lj1g  LeastasP2=M2. Moreover, since rj does not belong to
asP2, it is clear that neither Lj nor LPj belong to the least model. So M2 is a
stable model of asP2.
• If Lÿjÿ1 2 M1 then M2  M1 [ fLÿj g ÿ fLj; LPjg is a stable model of asP2. This
proof is similar to the one in the previous point. Simply note that, given that
Lj1 2 M2, there are no rules in asP2=M2 with Lÿj in the body. In fact, the
only rule in asP2 with L
ÿ
j in the body is an inheritance rule which also has
not Lj1, and thus the rule is removed in the modulo operation.
In both cases M2jK  M1jK.
2. The proof of this point is similar to the one above, and is omitted for brevity. 
Let Pn  fP ni : i 2 Sg be such that: if i < n then P ni  Pi ÿ frg; otherwise P ni  Pi.
We prove by induction on n that:
8n6 s : SM asP
ÿ jK  SM asPnÿ jK
Base: If n  0 then P  Pn, and the stable models are trivially the same.
Step: By induction hypothesis, SM asP
ÿ jK  SM asPnÿ1ÿ jK. By Lemma 6.1,
and since n6 s, 9 SM asP
nÿ1ÿ jK  SM asPnÿ jK. So, SM asPÿ jK 
SM asP
n
ÿ jK.
Since Ps  P0 (by construction of Pn), it follows that SM asP
ÿ jK 
SM asP
0ÿ jK.
Consequently, such background rules need not necessarily be added to every pro-
gram state. Instead, they can simply be added at the final state s. Such background
rules are therefore similar to the axioms CSs, which are added only when the state s
is fixed. In particular, considering the background rules in every program state is
equivalent to considering them as part of the axioms CSs. A more detailed discus-
sion of the formalization and usage of background knowledge appears in our follow-
up paper [4].
6.2. Dealing with contradiction
One of the important and also very dicult issues involving dynamic updates is
the issue of consistency of the updated program P  U . As stated in Section 2, we
consider a program to be consistent if it has at least one stable model and thus a
well-defined stable semantics. There are two basic reasons why the updated program
may not be consistent:
1. The updated generalized logic program P  U may contain explicitly contradicto-
ry information, such as A and not A; and thus not have any stable models. There
are basically three cases to consider:
(a) The contradictory information may be inherited from the original program
P, which was already inconsistent. In this case one of the possible approaches is
to prevent the contradictory information from being inherited by inertia by lim-
iting the inheritance by inertia. This approach is discussed in more detail in the
next section. Changing the rules of inertia so that they better suit our needs is
also discussed in Ref. [4].
9 Otherwise the lemma would not be applicable.
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(b) The contradictory information may be the result of the fact that the updat-
ing program U is itself contradictory. This is more dicult to eliminate because
the rules of the updating program U must be, by definition, true in the updated
program P  U . One approach is to always require the updating program U to
be consistent. If such a requirement is impossible to satisfy, we could accept
contradiction in the current update but prevent it from proliferating further
to the subsequent updates by using the approach discussed in (a).
(c) Both the original program and the updating program U may be perfectly
consistent and yet the resulting updated program may contain contradictory in-
formation. This is, for example, the case when the program containing two
rules: A B and not A is updated with the single fact: B: In this case, as in
the case (a), one of the possible approaches is to prevent the contradictory in-
formation from being part of the updated program by limiting the inheritance
by inertia. This approach is also discussed in more detail in the next section.
Another possibility is to establish some priorities between dierent rules in
order to prevent contradiction from arising in the first place.
2. Explicit contradiction, like the one discussed in (1), can only arise when the updat-
ed program contains some rules with default negation in there heads. Thus, it can-
not arise when the updated program is normal. However, as is well-known, even
normal logic programs may be implicitly inconsistent simply because they do not
have any stable models. One possible way of dealing with this problem is to
replace the stable semantics by the 3-valued stable, or, equivalently, well-founded
semantics. Every normal logic program is known to be consistent w.r.t. the
well-founded semantics, i.e., it has a well-defined well-founded semantics. In
our paper [5] we show how to extend the approach presented in this paper to
the 3-valued stable semantics.
There are many other possible approaches to contradiction removal in program
updates and they are part of our ongoing research in this area. However, a detailed
discussion of this subject goes beyond the scope of the current paper.
6.3. Limiting the inheritance by inertia
Inheritance rules (IR) describe the rules of inertia, i.e., the rules guiding the inher-
itance of knowledge from one state s to the next state s0. Specifically, they prevent the
inheritance of knowledge that is explicitly contradicted in the new state s0. However,
inheritance can be limited even further, by means of a simple modification of the
inheritance rules:
Modified Inheritance Rules (IR0):
As  Asÿ1; not rejectAsÿ1; 54
Aÿs  Aÿsÿ1; not rejectAÿsÿ1 55
rejectAsÿ1  AÿPs ; 56
rejectAÿsÿ1  APs 57
obtained by adding new predicates rejectAs and rejectAÿs  allowing us to specify
additional restrictions on inheritance.
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One important example of such additional constraints imposed on the inertia
rules involves removing from the current state s0 of any inconsistency that occurred
in the previous state s. Such inconsistency could have already existed in the previous
state s or could have been caused by the new information added at the current state
s0. In order to eliminate such contradictory information, it suces to add to the def-
inition of reject the following two rules:
rejectAsÿ1  Aÿsÿ1 58
rejectAÿsÿ1  Asÿ1 59
Similarly, the removal of contradictions brought about by the strong negation axi-
oms of 5.1 can be achieved by adding the rules:
rejectAsÿ1  ÿ Asÿ1 60
rejectÿAsÿ1  Asÿ1 61
Other conditions and applications can be coded in this way. In particular, suitable
rules can be used to enact preferences, to ensure compliance with integrity con-
straints or to ensure non-inertiality of fluents. Also, more complex contradiction
removal criteria can be similarly coded. 10
7. Conclusions and future work
We defined a program transformation that takes two generalized logic programs
P and U, and, produces the updated logic program P  U resulting from the update
of program P by U. We provided a complete characterization of the semantics of
program updates P  U and we established their basic properties. Our approach gen-
eralizes the so called revision programs introduced in Ref. [12]. Namely, in the special
case when the initial program is just a set of facts, our program update coincides with
the justified revision of Ref. [12]. In the general case, when the initial program also
contains rules, our program updates characterize precisely which of these rules re-
main valid by inertia, and which are rejected. We also showed how strong (or ‘‘clas-
sical’’) negation can be easily incorporated into the framework of program updates.
With the introduction of dynamic program updates, we have extended program
updates to ordered sets of logic programs (or modules). When this order is interpre-
ted as a time order, dynamic program updates describe the evolution of a logic pro-
gram which undergoes a sequence of modifications. This opens up the possibility of
incremental design and evolution of logic programs, leading to the paradigm of
dynamic logic programming. We believe that dynamic programming significantly
facilitates modularization of logic programming and, thus, modularization of non-
monotonic reasoning as a whole.
A specific application of dynamic logic programming that we intend to
explore, is the evolution and maintenance of software specifications. By using logic
10 In all such cases, the semantic characterization of program updates would have to be adjusted
accordingly to account for the change in their definition. However, pursuance of this topic is outside of the
scope of the present paper.
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programming as a specification language, dynamic programming provides the means
of representing the evolution of software specifications.
However, ordered sets of program modules need not necessarily be seen as just a
temporal evolution of a logic program. Dierent modules can also represent dierent
sets of priorities, or viewpoints of dierent agents. In the case of priorities, a dynamic
program update specifies the exact meaning of the ‘‘union’’ of the modules, subject to
the given priorities. We intend to further study the relationship between dynamic
logic programming and other preference-based approaches to knowledge representa-
tion.
Although not explored in here, a dynamic program update can be queried not
only about the current state but also about other states. If modules are seen as view-
points of dierent agents, the truth of some As in aP can be read as: A is true ac-
cording to agent s in a situation where the knowledge of the aP is ‘‘visible’’ to
agent s.
We have already generalized our approach and results to the 3-valued case, which
enables us to update programs under the well-founded semantics [5]. We have also
already developed a working implementation for the 3-valued case with top-down
querying (available at http : ==centria:di:fct:unl:pt=jja=updates=.
Our approach to program updates has grown out of our research on representing
non-monotonic knowledge by means of logic programs. We envisage enriching it in
the near future with other dynamic programming features, such as abduction and
contradiction removal. Among other applications that we intend to study are pro-
ductions systems modeling, reasoning about concurrent actions and active and tem-
poral databases (some preliminary results are already published in Ref. [5]).
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